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I.

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus Curiae, Darryll K. Jones (Jones) is Professor of
Law at Stetson University College of Law in Gulfport, Florida. 1
He has served in that position for two years. Prior to that, Jones
served as Assistant and Associate Professor of Law, and Associate
Dean of Academic Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He served in those positions,
sequentially from September 1999 until August 2006. He presently
serves as co-editor of the Nonprofit Law Professor Blog, accessible
online at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/. Prior to
entering the teaching profession, Professor Jones served as
Associate General Counsel at the University of Florida,
specializing in tax exempt law, and as General Counsel at
Columbia College Chicago.
Professor Jones has written and practiced extensively in the
area of tax-exempt organizations. His publications include The
Tax Law of Charities and Other Exempt Organizations (2d ed.
2007), Third Party Profit-Taking In Tax Exemption Jurisprudence,
2007 Brigham Young University Law Review 977 (2007), The
Scintilla of Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement and
Excess Benefit, 19 Virginia Tax Review 575 (2000), and Tax
Exemption Issues Facing Academic Health Centers in the
Managed Care Environment, 24 Journal of College and University
Law 261 (1997) among several other publications regarding tax
exemption. His publication, When Charity Aids Tax Shelters, 4
FLORIDA TAX REVIEW 769 (2001) served as a model for a provision
subsequently enacted by Congress in an effort to police the
involvement of tax-exempt organizations in improper tax shelter
No party or counsel for any party authored any portion of this brief or made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief. No entity other than
amicus curiae Darryll K. Jones or his counsel monetarily contributed to the preparation or
submission of this brief. The Petitioner and the Respondent were given timely notice of the intent
to file this brief under Supreme Court Rule 37, and both parties consented to the filing of this
brief.
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transactions. See section 4965 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended (the “Code”). Professor Jones’ particular
interest with respect to this case involves the application of the
“private benefit” doctrine, under which the Internal Revenue
Service (“the Service”) denies or revokes tax exempt status on the
basis that an organization improperly benefits private,
noncharitable individuals.

II.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case involves a matter of extreme importance to the
entire nonprofit health maintenance organization (HMO) industry.
The court below held, based upon an unexplained and
misunderstood application of the private benefit doctrine, that an
HMO operating under a membership structure primarily served the
private benefit of its subscribers and, therefore, is not entitled to
tax exemption under section 501(c)(4) of the Code. It is true that
the private benefit doctrine is implicated when a nonprofit
organization confers private benefit on non-charitable recipients,
such as the members of the HMO. The private benefit doctrine,
however, does not preclude an organization from economic
dealings with a non-charitable class of persons when doing so is
necessary to accomplish its charitable or social-welfare purpose.
For example, nonprofit hospitals routinely provide “profits” in the
form of compensation to physicians and other service providers
that they employ to achieve their charitable healthcare goals.
Likewise, nonprofit HMOs cannot possibly achieve their charitable
purpose without a membership form of organization.
The fatal flaw in the Ninth Circuit’s analysis and
conclusion is that (1) it fails to heed to Congress’ explicit
statement to the contrary and (2) it adopts a rule entirely without
regard to the context surrounding the health care market place. As
to the first flaw, Congress has explicitly stated that nonprofit
HMOs shall not be excluded from tax exemption. See I.R.C.
§ 501(m)(3). By contrast, the court below ruled that a membership
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form of organization, even one providing for a subsidized dues
program, precludes tax exemption.
This holding directly
contradicts clear congressional intent. Congress specifically
exempted “health maintenance organizations” from the definition
of commercial insurance activities. See I.R.C. § 501(m)(3)(B). In
so doing, Congress was describing organizations whose defining
characteristic is their existence as associations formed to control
healthcare costs, to increase the supply of health care services, and
to extend those services to individuals unable to pay for their own
care.
As to the second flaw, the modern health care marketplace
demands that health care providers deliver large and predictable
patient volume that can only be derived from a membership base.
Virtually all HMOs are “organizations” of members who band
together to obtain health services from nonprofit providers. A
judicially imposed rule precluding tax exemption for HMOs
because of their invariable “membership” structure would
effectively preclude tax exemption for all nonprofit HMOs,
making a dead letter of Congress’ careful effort to preserve tax
exemption for such “organizations” of subscribers. HMOs without
members have never existed and, in any event, could not compete
with for-profit HMOs in order to achieve their charitable purpose
of providing indispensable services.
The opinion below effectively raises a categorical bar
against tax exemption for HMOs, the fiduciaries of whom seek the
pubic good rather than private gain. Even as they pursue the
public good, nonprofit HMO’s must engage for-profit service
providers. Like all tax-exempt entities, nonprofit HMOs must
enter into contracts and compete for goods and services also sought
by the for-profit sector. The fiduciaries of nonprofit HMO’s are
not exempt them from the market forces prevalent in society
merely because they eschew private profit in support of the public
good. Thus, nonprofit HMOs, just like any other nonprofit entity
must necessarily comply with implicit market rules to achieve their
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charitable purpose. A rule prohibiting HMOs from adopting the
organizational membership structure, a structure absolutely
demanded in the marketplace, effectively denies tax exempt status
to all nonprofit HMOs.

III.

ARGUMENT

A.

The Membership Organization Proscribed by the Court
Below Is Necessary to the Accomplishment of the
Charitable and Social-Welfare Purpose for Which
Congress Has Granted Tax Exemption.

The court below essentially held that a membership form of
organization results in private benefit to the members and, thus,
precludes tax exemption. The conclusion represents a fundamental
misunderstanding of the factors necessary to achieve a charitable
or social welfare purpose. The conclusion fails to distinguish
effect from intent. As noted by the Internal Revenue Service and
at least two commentators, private benefit is an inevitable
prerequisite to the accomplishment of a charitable or social welfare
purpose. Darryll K. Jones, Third Party Profit-Taking In Tax
Exemption Jurisprudence, 2007 BYU L. Rev. 977, 981 (2007);
John D. Columbo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV.
1063 (2006). In short, the public good cannot be achieved without
private benefit. This is especially true with regard to a public good
that is at once indispensable to the social good and subject to
monopolization by for-profit healthcare providers.
Charitable health care and health care services provided for
the purpose of increasing social welfare cannot possibly be
accomplished without the cooperation of for-profit service
providers, such as physicians who either provide the actual
services or insurers who actually subsidize charitable health care
via payments to nonprofit health care providers. That cooperation
is gained exclusively through the ability of nonprofit health care
organizations to offer economic incentives comparable to those
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available from for-profit health care providers. As noted above,
for-profit HMOs utilize a membership base to deliver larger patient
volume to practitioners and negotiate lower fees payable by
insurers. Through this process, investors in the for-profit HMOs
achieve a return on their investment. Nonprofit health care
organizations rely upon the same service providers and third party
payers to extend those vital health care services to the poor and to
encourage the search for new cures. Thus, nonprofit health care
organizations must necessarily offer incentives similar to those
available from for-profit health care organizations. Doing so is not
indicative of intent to enrich private individuals but rather is
necessary to harness market resources for the public good in a
manner suitable for tax exemption.

B.

Precluding Tax Exemption Because of an HMO’s
Membership Structure Effectively Repeals Tax
Exemption Granted by Congress and Prevents All
HMOs from Operating Charitably.

For the reasons explained above, a judicially imposed rule
precluding tax exemption for HMOs because of their invariable
membership structure would effectively preclude tax exemption
where Congress has explicitly granted tax exemption. As a
doctrinal matter, this outcome is directly contrary to Congress’
intent. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at page 15,
adequately states the proposition:
In 1986, Congress reviewed the tax-exempt status of health
care companies in light of changes in the health care
marketplace, particularly the increase in competitive, forprofit health insurers. As part of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, Congress adopted
what is now Code section 501(m). This section denies a tax
exemption under 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) to organizations
that offer “commercial-type insurance.”
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At the same time that it revoked tax exemptions for
providers of “commercial-type insurance,” however,
Congress expressly retained the existing tax-exempt status
for nonprofit HMOs, including HMOs offering supplemental
services such as vision or dental plans.
Section
501(m)(3)(B) thus provides that “commercial-type
insurances should not include “incidental health insurance
provided by a health maintenance organization of a kind
customarily provided by such organizations.”
Petitioner’s brief continues by correctly explaining that Congress
later confirmed that it intends to allow the availability of tax
exempt status for organizations that “operate in the same manner
as a health maintenance organization.” As noted above, the
membership form of organization is the single defining
characteristic of HMOs. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that
Congress explicitly intended to make tax exemption available to
organizations that have members in an effort to increase the
amount of health care services in the marketplace without limiting
those services solely to those who are able to afford such services.
By contrast, the court below relied exclusively on the very
characteristic defining HMOs as the basis for precluding those
organizations from tax exempt status. Should its analysis prevail,
the court below will have effectively overruled Congress’
judgment that a membership organization is no bar to tax exempt
status. Indeed, as explained above and as recognized by the
market itself, utilizing a membership structure is essential to
offering healthcare services whether on a for-profit or a nonprofit
tax-exempt basis.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner, and other amici curiae have convincingly set
forth the legal basis that compels review of the opinion of the court
below. The broader purpose of this brief is to place the opinion of
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the court below in the context of the for-profit and nonprofit health
care marketplace. The opinion of the court below fails to consider
the real-world healthcare marketplace in which its conclusion is to
apply. Instead, it adopts an arbitrary rule without regard to the
historical context in which nonprofit HMOs have existed and
reaches a conclusion that, if sustained, will categorically preclude
tax exemption for all nonprofit HMOs; the defining quality –
indeed the factor absolutely necessary to the existence of nonprofit
HMOs – is the membership structure found disqualifying by the
court below. This is most certainly contrary to Congressional
intent and, even worse, decreases the amount of charitable health
care available to society.
Respectfully submitted,
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